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L THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDG-
MENT AND DISMISSING PLAINTIFFS' COM-
PLAINT - NO CAUSE OF ACTION -·-· 
(a) In ruling on defendants' motion for summary 
judgment the District Court was required to 
consider the pleadings and depositions most 
favorably to plaintiffs ... 
(b) A determination of whether or not there has 
been a valid delivery requires the Court to as-
certain the intent on the part of the grantor, and 
plaintiffs are entitled to a trial in regard to 
this matter, with opportunity to produce evi-
dence showing the intent of the grantor · 
(c) Plaintiffs should have been permitted to have 
a trial on the issues and produce evidence to 
prove their contentions that the deeds in que>-
tion were void by reason of the fact that they 
were an invalid attempt to make a testamentary 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
l 11'\THULLED HECElY~\BLES, INC., 
~-tali niqioration, and CLATDE D. 
ILUOIA:;, an individual, 
Plailltif/1>, 
vs. 
DUX 1-L\.Rl.IAK and LILA HARMAN, 
lus \\'ife. and \rILLIAJ\I BLAKE HAR-
.\IOX, a/k;a BLAKE HAR.MAK and 
tJ 1LLEE~ HAR~IOX, his wifr, 






AJ11wal from the Judgment of the 
Third District Court for Salt Lake County 
l l onornhk ~tewart 1\L Hansen, Judge 
1\fcKA Y AND Bl'RTON, 
Reed H. Richards and 
Barrie G. 1\IcKay 
720 Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys fur Appellant 
:li~BEY, HOKXO\Y, :'.\IADSI~N & 1\IARSDEN 
.ii+ East :2nd South Str<•Pt 
~alt Lak(• Cih Ptah 
1 . ' 
,- lt()ri1cys for Res1Jondc11ts 
2 
APPELLANTS' JWIEI•' 
STATE.MEN'l' OF THE Kl.\'D OF l'.\~E 
This action is set out in two causPs or action. Th 
First Cause of Action is a suit to quid tit!P in the plan: 
tiff Claude D. Harman and his snccpssors in intt'l''""' 
to the land in <1uestion located in Salt Lake Count;. rtali 
being a part of the Southwt•st quartPr of Sl·dio11 ~!1. 
TownshiIJ 1 South, Range 1 \Vest, Salt Lake Ba~l' a11u 
:Meridian. (R. 14-15) 
The Second Cause of Action asks the Court !t1 'ti 
aside and declare null and void certain deeds under \rhicli 
the defendants claim an interest in subject pro1wrty on 
the ground that there was no delivery, and on the a1l· 
ditional ground that the deeds \n·n• intended to tak1• 
effect only upon the death of plaintiff Claud<> D. llarwan. 
and were an attempt to make a tPstarn<>ntar.1· dispos1· 
tion of the property, and did not c0111pl;· \rith tlH' l'l' 
c1uirements for a testamentary dispositi 011. ( H. J 3-li) 
DlSPOSI'rIOX I:N' LO\YEH l'OU~T 
The District Court granted defendants' Jllotiun 111 ' 
summarv iud<rment dismissinrr lJlaintiffs' eornplaint -
• ~ 0 ' 0 
no cause of action. ( R 33) Plain ti fi"; appt'<d J'rolll 'u('h 
judgment. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiffs seek revPrsal of tlw Distriet Court's sulll· 
·cl t cl' · · l · t'f'i' · la1'11t anrlw mary JU guwn ·, 1srn1ssmg p am 1 s· cowp · ' 
3 
qiwst judgment m tlt('ir favor voiding said deeds as a 
niattl'r of law, or that failing, vlaintiffs request an order 
rrn1andi11g said aetion to the District Court for a trial 
or thv issues. 
~TATE~lENT OF FACTS 
l'iaintiff Claude D. Harman, since the year 1930, 
lias lw\n the O"\\·ner and in possession of two parcels of 
property located in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
one of which has tlw general address of 3966 West 3500 
South, Uranger, Utah, consisting of 11,4 acres of ground, 
and fronts on 3500 South Street. (R. JO, p. 2 - Lines 18-25) 
There was a small, modest frame home constructed on 
this parcel in the early 1930's in which the plaintiff 
Claude D. Harman has lived since its construction to 
<late, ·with his wife, until her death in approximately 1942 
and in which the family was raised until they left home. 
The other parl'el of property is approxmately 8% acres 
of land and lies Northeast of the 11,4 acre parcel. (R. 43, 
Ji. 3 - Line:-; 18-22; p. 13 - Lines 21-25) 
~n 19-t! th.e plai~tifff Claude D. Harman, t~en a 
indo.ver with four children, all of whom were mmors, 
ill. -±0, p. 3 - Lines 1-3; p. J - Lines 12-13) was encour-
aged by his brother and sister-in-law to make arrange-
rnents so that in the event of his death his property 
would be divided equally among his children and avoid 
lJl'obate with all the 1~x1wnses connected therewith. (R. 
-10, 11· 3 - Lines 1-30) 
Hi,, brother and siskr-in-law, Franklin Hannan and 
4 
br pJ#i1YJ h,'s frorr+ r 
hi~ wif/ M~rian, i:l~gge::;_k<l tl,1at i:5Ueh eoul<l be acc0111. 
phshcd.1rn lm; and h18 cluldren 1:5 nauw:,;, a:' joint tenant,, 
(R. -±0, p. 3 - Line8 20-28). Plaintiff Claude D. Harman. 
following the in::5truction of Franklin Hannan, and be. 
lieving that thereby he would retain eomplctP ownership 
and control of said property and provide for tht> passing 
of it to his children upon hil:l death, executed a dPPd to 
Yranklin Hannan ( R 41 p. 13 - LinPl:l G-2f>: H. +lJ. p. +, 
Lines lG-19; p. 10 - Lim•1:5 23-30; p. 13 - Lines 1~-15: 
p. 5 - Lines 13-19) and Franklin Han nan, as strawman, 
executed a deed as grantor to Claude D. Hannan and 
his minor children : Barbara Louis(' J [arman, Blah 
Harman, Don Harman and Larry 11 arman, g-rantePs, as 
joint tenants and not as tenants in eom111011. (R. -±IJ, 
p. 3 - Lines 10-11) These deed::; were ncn·r <lt:>liwred 
by Claude D. Harman to his children or any other per· 
son ( R. -±0, p. 8 - Lines 3-5), but somehow Wl'l'P rPcorded 
without the knowledge or consL•nt of the plaintiff l'lamk 
D. Harman. (R. -±0, p. lG - Line::; 11-15) Plaintiff Claude 
D. Harman continued to live on the home property and 
possess both of said parce~s, exereising all the rights of 
_ownership, paid all of the taxes on said property, (R. 111. 
p. 4 - Lines 28-29) paid for all upkeep and maintenancE 
expenses, (R. 40, p. 4 - Line 30, p. 5 - Linr 1) and in 
b · lu 0 iwh every way treated the lJroperty as erng l~xc 0 • 
his. On the other hand, the def endanti:l Don Harman and 
Blake Harman and the othPr children of Claude D. Har· 
man contributed nothincr to maintaining the property. ' ~ ~ l 
They were {)Vt~n paid hy their f'atlwr for all (']lores an.: 
work performed by them in and on tlw property. (R. L, 
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11. !I . Li111·" i:;-:;1J a11d p. I 11 Lin•· 1 : H. -t:;, p. -t, Lirws 
]:,:.:;tJJ. l,.urtlt(')', tlw •·l1ildn·11 at all ti11}(',; treat<'<l and 
nfrn1·1l ti) tl1•· [!1'•1p1·rty a:-: !wing- c•xf'lu:-:iY<·ly their fa-
tl!i'l'·~. F(Jr 1·xa11qiJ,., i11 EJ:J~J d<·frndant Don Harman 
1·1·1 1 1w~ll1l J1i,., J'ath1·r to prnYid1· him \\ ith seeurity so 
that 111· 1·1·L111l purdia,_,. a :-<l'lTif'<' :-:tation business from 
L1111 l'acl..:ard. l'Jaintiff Claude• D. 11arnian t•xeeuted a 
i1111rt!.:;aµ•· t(J ::\1 r. l 'al'kard 1·0\·•·ring both of said pareeb. 
rR +11. p. 1; - Lin•·=' 1-l~J) ~\ltl1oug-1t all of the d1ildren 
111·1l' a\\ an· of tlH· transaction, 1101w ohjedPd to the mort-
~ag:r· and num· tl1ougl1t it rn•r·1·:-::-:ary that they sign. Don 
Hannan dicl in fad siµ;n th1· mortgage in connedion 
11·it!t t]u· otl11·r pap1·r:-: of' t]i,. trnn:-:aetion, hut did not 
kn1111 that Ju. had :-:igrw<l tht• mortgagP on his father's 
11n 1J11'rt\· until tl1,· n•1t1· \\·as paid off and the mortgage 
n•l,·a~ 1 ·d arnl Ji,. t'ournl tlw rnort<rairc• amon<r the impers. ,,.., ,., 0 
IH. -L:, l'· 1 l - Lin•·:-: ~'1-:Ju, ll. U - LinPs 1-7) Also, late 
i11 tl11· y•·ar 1 'Jii:; th• plaintiff ('Janek D. Harman, without 
•il·tai11i11µ: 1 !,,. 1·nn:-:1·nt of any of his children and without 
;in.- .,l,,j1·1·ti1111 11n tl1(• iiart of hi:-: ehildren, sold the one 
[ial'ct'l 11 1' land 1·0111pri,;i11g apprnximately 81 :i aeres to 
Pancak(', I Ill' .. a !"tali corporation. ( R. -10, p. 1:2 - Lines 
~-li;1 Jn ordl·r to cll·ar tli•· n·r·onl title to said propt•rty 
111 1
•
1.1J1111·ctio11 \\itli :-:nd1 :-:al•·. (l•·frndanb Blak<' Hannan 
and hi:-; \1 il'1· l'oll1·•·11, \Yitl1ont n•qm•,;ting- any eonsider-
atiun. •'X(•1·ut1·d a 'Jllit-clairn dP<·<l to ClandP D. Hannan 
:-l~pkmh,'l' :3, 1 %:;, and <ld(•n<lants Don Hannan and 
hi~ irif\' a11d Larn I larnia11 and Iii,; wifr and Barbara 
L11ni~. I!· . . . . . ' . . 
( cll lll,lJl, \\'ltlio111 n·q111',;tlng an~· eon,;1cll'rat1on, 
1·x1·c·ut · l · · · ll a q111t-r-la1111 dP1·d to Claud<' D. llanmm Oetolwr 
G 
+, 1%3. (H. +u, p .. ') - Lines 1 (i-:2:2: p. J l - Lin1·~ :.!1-:llJ) 
On ~Iay :2:3, 1 !lG-t Claud!' D. llarnian \l"C\s still tn·al 
ing the remaining prnp(•rt:-· as IJPing 1•x(·lusin"ly hi~. a11 1i 
without obtaining his ('hildren's (·ons(•nt 1·x .. eutPd an 1•p-
tion to Pete Hannan in which h(· agn·!'d to o:"ll tP l'l'!t 
Hannan tlH_· said 111 aen· pan·•·I. ( H. -to, Ji. 11 . Lin"·' 
1-:!U; p.1:2- Lin(•s ;>-lG) l"pon l'l'<fll(·st and \ritlwutall\ 
eonsid(•ration or ohjeetion, Larry I lannan and hi~ \rif .. 
and Bar hara Louise 11 arrnan <'OJJY('Yf'd Ii~· quit-dairn d1·1«l 
t!H_•ir reeonl inten•st in th(• J 1_1-J- H<'n· pan·(•I to th1•ir fatht· 1• 
Claude D. Hannan. (H. +U, p. S - Lin(•s :2:l-:2~) 
As was <lom• in n•ganl to th1· .~1 :: ac·n· par1·f'l, Don 
Harman and Blake J lannan "·(·n· rt·qtw:-t('fl to gin• quit-
daim deeds in regard to tlw 11 ! a('!'t• pan·1·I. but thl'Y 
both refused to do so ( H. -UJ, p. S - Li m·s 23-~S). anJ 
this adion was brought in ord1·r to dt·ar till' n·c·oril 
title to the 1 % acre pare<·! of propl'l'ty. 
POINT NO. I 
A. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRAJ'l'TIN~ 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION F 0 R SUMMARl 
JUDGMENT DISl\IISSING PLAINTIFFS' COM· 
PLAINT - NO CAUSE OF ACTION. 
The Distrid Court grantf'd dt•frndauts' nwtion fol 
. <l 1· -. . I . t. f'f' ' i1ilaint on suuunary .JU grnent ( 1s1n1ssmg }Jam I s l'Oll 
tl I . J I . t. f'f' J't"•Juded Hi ie erroneom; eon(' us10!l t iat p am 1 :-.: an· P " 
f. I f' l . . I t sl10\\· that a rnatt<·r o aw rm11 pro< ll<'lllg 1'\'J< f'IH'(' 0 · 
l I I I . I I I f' I I . . II'" ·111 i11t1·1'· a< 1·e< llll< ('J' ,,. 11<· 1 t Jt• < t• 1•Jl< ants an• t' a11111 ,.., ' . 
I l t .;·11d l'~t i11 suhjt><·t prnpt•rty \1·as not d(•li\·en·d alll tin " 
7 
di·i·1l 1rn.-' prqian·d a11<l 1·x1·C'nb·<l as an att1·!llpte<l h•:;ta-
1ui·ntar;· dic:tnlllltion an1l is th(·rdon· void. The Di:;-
rnd l'o:1rt\ ruling ic: contrary to well Pstablished law 
in tlw :-;tat1· of i ·tah and if !JPl'lllittP<l to stand would 
11p1·n tlH· '!·aft' 10 ,,·holPsak· fraud in that any person 
111uld preJ1Hr1· a 1k1·d and daim title to property, and 
:ind i11·r"1!ll 1"1nt1•,,ting th1· clP1·cl \umlcl be precluded from 
]IJ'(l(ltl<'ill'-'.' 1·Yid••Jl('(' to pron· otlH•l\\"iSt'. (3-! A.LR 2d, 
:,~s, .i9:l J 
Tl11· Di,,trid l'omt fail1'(l to follow well established 
lmr n·quinng it to consider tlw fact:; most favorable to 
th1~ plaintiff,- \\ lwn l'On:;idPring defrndants' motion for 
.'llllllllar;· judt,'ltH·nt. lt furtiH'l' crrPd in not following 
l'tah la\1· 1d1id1 <·l1·arly perlllits tPstimony from the gran-
tc·r and utlwr 1•Yi(h·n<·1· of ad:; and statements in deter-
111ming 11-hetlH·r or not tlw d0eds were void for lack of 
1Hiw,.~-, and has failP<l to follow establislwd law which 
J1>·nuib plaintiffs to prP::;ent testimony and other evi-
d1·111·1· at a trial to proyp that the deed::; wPre void be-
i·au~1· tl11·; w1 n· an attt>mpted testamentary disposition 
11 llld1 did not conform to tP:otamentary requirements. 
I:\ RCLING ON THE DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
:'U;\I'.IIARY Jl:DG:\IENT THE DISTRICT COURT 
WAS REQUIRED TO CO~SIDER THE PLEADINGS 
,\ND DEPOSITIONS l\IOST FAVORABLE TO THE 
PLAI:\TIFFS. 
Tlw l"tah ~upr\•m1· l'onrt in tlH• ease of La rcre Kid-
111u11 I'/ 111. 1 s. f,11ri111' II. ffhitc. et al., 1.f lTtah (:2d) 1-12, 
:11s p ·) 1 ~·<i . · . _ ·-< ''· S, ~)()(), stat1·<l th1• la11· m r<'ganl to tht> grant-
lllg of "lllll11iar>- judg-1111•nt as follow~: 
8 
"In confronting the problem prt:,;ented 011 
this appeal we have been obliged to remain awar'. 
that a sm111nar~' judgment, which ~urns a part) 
out of court without an opportumty to presrn! 
his evidence, is a harsh measure that should Jw 
granted only when, taking the view most favorabll' 
to a party's claim and any proof that might prop-
erly be adduced thereunder, he could in no even! 
prevail.'' 
"See stakmcnt in Samms Y. Bccle~, 11 Ltah 
(2d) 289, 358 P.2d 344 (1963)." 
Plaintiffs' amended complaint sets forth bro cause> 
of action. The First Couse of Action is a quiet title 
action and defendants should have been required to set 
forth their claims, if any, to an interest in the property 
and plaintiffs were entitled to a trial on the issues thlL'! 
raised. 
The Second Cause of Action seeks to han~ the dePd 
under which defendants claim an interest in the propert) 
voided on the ground of lack of delivery, and on the 
further ~bund that it was an attempted testamentan· 
disposition. Plaintiffs should have been permitted tc 
produce evidence at a trial and prove their contention~. 1 
Plaintiffs have substantial evidence to present to 
the Court in regard to the two issues, - it being plain· ' 
tiffs' contention that the deeds were never delivered to 
the children at any time, and that the recording of the 
same was without the knowledge and consent of grantor 
Claude D. Harman. It is also plaintiffs' contention that 
. t ide<l t11 
said Claude D. Harman, as grantor, never m ei . 
. h' . I 'Id ·u11 hut wa> pass any present mten'st to is unnor c 11 h 
9 
uwrely follo\\·ing a form which he had been advised to 
usi: li:· hrn brother, ,,·ith tlw belief and understanding 
that the deeds '' ould take effect only upon his death. 
At the time the District Court granted defendants' 
!llotion for i,;ummary judgment, the only things it had 
liefon· it to eonsider \\'ere the pleadings and the depo-
,;itions of plaintiff Claude D. Harmon and defendants 
Don Hannan and Blake Harmon. In Plaintiffs' plead-
ings and in plaintiff Claude D. Harman's deposition, 
plaintiffs have consistently and strenuously maintained 
that tlwre was never a delivery of the deeds under which 
ddendants claim an interest in subject property, and 
that sul'l1 deeds were prepared and executed as an at-
tem11ted testamentary disposition and do not conform 
to tlw t-ltatute of Wills, and are therefore void. There is 
no evi<lenee in eithtT the defendants' pleadings or depo-
sitions tll l'Pfutp the contentions of plaintiffs and the 
ddPndants have contended that they have an interest in 
the prnperty on the flimsy argument that deeds exist 
and that SU<'.h deeds were recorded and that these two 
facts preclude plaintiffs from showing any evidence 
ll'ltich would invalidate such deeds. Such, of course, is 
not the law, and it was error for the District Court 
tu aceept clrfendants' argument as the law and a basis 
for tlw ~ununary judgment. 
The Court's attt>ntion is called to the fact that de-
fendants in thPir motion for smnmary judgment contend 
t.hat thel'e is no dispnt(• as to tlw facts in the case. There-
fore, in considl•ring tlll" smmnary judgment, the District 
10 
Court is required to eonsidt·r thP east· rnost l'aYorabli· 111 
the plaintiffs, and in vie\\· of deft·n<lanbi' a<lmL_..,~ion tJwt 
there is no contnw('rsy c·om·(•rning fads. tlll'll tht allega-
tion of the plaintiffs that tht·rp was 110 cleliwr>·· and 
that the del•ds in question \\·(•J'l• attm1pt!•d tPstamL•ntar.r 
disposition and tht•rl'fon· void, must staml a:-: established 
fact, and, further, in view of the f aet that ckfrndants har" 
shown no evidenee and apparently by n·aso11 of th,,ir 
motion for summary judgment do not intend to shrnr 
any_ evidence to refute plaintiff's' c·<mtPntion, plaintiffa 
are entitled to a sm11111ary judgwent dedaring that tlll' 
deed from Claude D. Hannan, dated tlw 20th day of 
February, 19-:1-7, to Franklin Hannan, as a stra\\' man, 
a~d the deed from l~ranklin Hannan to l'Jaudr· D. Har· 
man and his children, as joint tenants, bearing the sauw 
date, are void and of no effect, and that thereby defend-
ants have no interest in the suhjeet prnp!·rt~-. 
B. A DETERMINATION OF WHETHER OR NOT 
THERE HAS BEEN A VALID DELIVERY RE· 
QUIRES THE COURT TO ASCERTAIN THE IN· 
TENT ON THE PART OF THE GRANTOR, AND 
PLAINTIFFS ARE ENTITLED TO A TRIAL IN 
REGARD TO THIS MATTER, WITH OPPOR· 
TUNITY TO PRODUCE EVIDENCE SHOWING 
THE INTENT OF THE GRANTOR. 
The Utah Supreme Court has dearly established in 
this jurisdiction that the intent on the part of thP grant.or 
is the eontrolling factor in d!'krrnining- the validity 01 _a 
deed. ln Firsl tlcc1trity !Ja11k r. /J1trf/i, U:Z ['tah -UJ, 
251 Pac (2d) 297, 299, 'l'li1• Utah ~upn·llll' Court held: 
11 
•·Deliver» is t_•:-;:-;entially a matter of intent. 
Su<'h 1nknt i8 to be arrived at from all the facts 
and surrounding circmnstances hoth before and 
aft!·r tlw dak of the deed, including declarations 
of th!• allegi>d grantor where it appears that the 
ch•elarations an• made fairly and in the ordinary 
course of life. Stanley r. Stanley, 97 Utah 520, 
('OUI"H' of life. 8tanley v. Stanley, 97 Utah 520, 
9-!- Pa<:. (:2d) -l-ti3: JlowPr v. ;\lower, G-1 Utah :.?60; 
:2:28 Pac. 81-±." 
Tlw is~m· in qm·stion in the case at bar is the intent 
of the· grantor and the above cited Burgi case clearly 
~!ates that the law in this jurisdiction is that the plain-
tiffs have a right to produce evidence concerning the 
wrrounding circumstances, both before and after the 
Jate of the deed, "including declarations of the alleged 
grantor where it appears that declarations are made 
fairly and in the ordinary course of life." The District 
Court's summary judgment denied plaintiffs this very 
important right. 
Other Utah Supreme Court cases which substantiate 
this position are Stanley v. Stanley 97 Utah 520, 94 Pac. 
l~d) .J.65, where this Court hdd as follows: 
''In the course of these various transactions 
lw had repeatedly stated and represented that 
he was the owner of the property, such statements, 
lt~\:ever, hPing admissible only upon the question 
of mtent to presently pass title, if in fact, there 
had been a manual delivery." 
1'.2 
See also the case of Clza111{)1:rloi11 1. L111s,'11. SJ rtali 
420, :29 Pac. (:2d) 333, wlH·n· th<· Supn·1iw c'oL1rt held 
as follmn; : 
"The court (·om111ittPd no enor in adrnittin~ 
evidence of the acts, conduct and declaration~ nl 
l\liss Bennett in ref erente tJ'Iihe property, !llade 
after the date of the deed. \Ylwn· as in thi, eu~1 
the i::;stH• is whether the grantor named in th1· 
deed had <-·ver parted with her title, eY1denee that 
the alleged grantor, after tlw ::;igning of the deerl. 
continued to pay taxes, carried the insurancf· m 
her own name, and offered to sell a portion of the 
property, wa::; admissible on the issue of intent10n 
to delivPr the deed." 
Coun::;el for defendant cited to the District Cu1ut 
during the argument the line of ea::;es in 31 ALR ~~. 
contending that such cases \\'('!'('controlling in the in8tan: 
matter. A reading of such cases will renal that ~ithir 
the issue involved "·as somethinO' other than a ddt·rminu 
b 
tion of the intent of the grantor, which is tlic issue in uii, 
case, or the decision expressed a minorit:·: rnlt:>. Th·~ 
annotation cited in 34 ALR ( 2d) 388, 39:.2, adrnowledgi·c 
that some jurisdictions havP held tlw aet and (lt•daration 
of the grantor as inaclmissibl<·, but point::; out that t111 1 
issue of intent was not vn•st:·nt in sueh ca:-<·s and coll , 
. . . ·] ;th 'I' th1· eluded that where the <1uest10n at issm· is " ie 1 
· 1 I· · uncondi· grantor mtendl'd to make a legal ( e ivery, i.r" 
tionally divest himself of title by instrm1wnt in the form 
of a dl~('d of <·onv<·nmc<' <kdarations of :-;n('Ji grantor nri• 
. . '. ' . · f' · t; 1t for 
adu11ssl1Jle as IJ<-•anng on the vital questwn o in ° 
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thl· 1rnrpos1· of defrnuining ,,·hdher or not there was in 
('ullll'lll!Jlation of la"· an effedin delivery. 34 ALR (2d) 
:JS8, 3!J:2: 
"2. Although it is \n•ll settled that acts and 
dPc·laratiorn; of a grantor made after he was part-
t·d with tht• title to the property in disparagement 
t1f its effeetive delivery are inadmissible when 
u1ade in the absence of the grantee, a point con-
l'<'de<l b:· many of the cases below, nevertheless 
the following cases hold or recognize that where 
the wr;; question at issue is whether the grantor 
intended to make a legal delivery, that is, to un-
conditionally divest himself of the title by an 
instrument in the form of a deed of conveyance, 
declarations of such grantor after physically de-
1 ivering the deed to the grantee or to a third 
person to hold for the grantee until some future 
time art' admissible as bearing on the vital ques-
tion of intent for the purpose of determining 
"·hether or not there was in contemplation of law 
an effective delivery." 
l'a:ws cited ineludes the following Uta11 case 111 ou:er 
r·s . .llowcr (192-!) 6-! l~tah 260, 228P. 911; Chamberlain 
1 "· Larsc 11 1 ( 193-!) 83 LI tah -!20, 29 P. 2d 355; Stanley vs. 
Sf(l/dey ( 19:39) 97 l~tah 520, 9-1 P. 2d -!65; First Security 
Dank i·s. Burgi (1952) 122 l'tah -!-15, 251 P. 2d 297. 
ln support of the statement the ALH annotation . ' cite~ Ctah and California cases as the key cases. The 
an t t' no a 10n goes on by acknowkdcring that there is some • 0 
confliet hl't\\'t>Pn tlw dl·eisions of different jurisdictions 
111 regard to the question and says: 
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"But the better reasoned c·asL·~· a:; d(·~i"nat1 .. J 
" in 25 Columbia La,,- Heview, :~73, \Yhil'lt nun- aJ,,, 
be fairly considered the weight of anthorit~:, rn11 1 
port the rule stated at the beginning of t!ti:.; ,, 1 
tion. In this connection, the following n~111arli> 
from the law review article above cited l!la\ 111 
adverted to: 'To exclitde all e1:ide11cc prcj111hiui 
to the guwt after the alleged dcliun; is tu U<!• /,,. 
very question in i:;sue, i.e. irhethcr dclil'cry c1:: 
occurred. That view, moreor<'r, 1rn11ld open liir 
door to fraud. By merely claillling dcliury at o 
certain date, such evidence of 1wn-deliucry 1rn11/ri 
be excluded. A verson ha1_:ing forged a deed co11/ii 
keep out evidence of great importance, riz: the 
statements and actions of the supposed granlu!'. 
by the mere assertion that the delircry 1ws on th 
purported date of the instrmnent.'" 
In many cases where this issue is raised the grantor 
is deceased but the instance case is one of the fe\\' cam 
' 
where the Court has an opportunity to hear tL·~tirnun1 
from the grantor in regard to his intent. The Californi 11 
Supreme Court has made it clear that tlH· argument that 
such would be self-serving is not valid, and the grantin·~ 
testimony should be admitted. 
See Kelly v. Bank of America Xatiuwtl Trnsl ,\ 
Sai:ings Association, 2-±2 Pac. (2d) 92:_l (Cal.), in 1diil'l: 
the Court stated in part as follows: 
. . . ·heth1'i 
''However where as here the Issue I:-- '' 
the err an tor intended that the' deed should b'.~ pre
1
;· 
a . . . .1, 11 , 81b 1·. ently operative, ::-;uch testnuony IS awt · .11 
r , l . ~ (''Jv l'-i.f P·u· l-1 I Huth v. 1...._atz, JO (;al. ( 2c ) (i():), )l ,,, ' ~. 1· ('\!' 321. As was said in Whitlow v. Durst, :W La· - · 
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323. 1:21 l'ae. ( 2d) ;:i;~o. 331. When intent is a 
!llakrial PlP111('nt of a disputed fact, declarations 
of a dt>ced1•nt made after as well as before an 
aVi1·gPd aet that indicate the intent with which 
Ji,. 1wrforn1t•d the act an• admissible in evidence 
a:-; an ('X<'l'ption to the hearsay rule, and it is 
i1m11aterial that such declarations are self-serving. 
Tlrn~, in cases involving the delivery of deeds, 
dt•daration~ of the alleged grantor made before 
and affrr tlw making of the deed are admissible 
upon tht· issue of delivery, a11d it is immaterial 
llwt said dl'clarutions arc in the interest of the 
1mrlJ/ producillff them.'" (cases cited) (emphasis 
added) 
In order to aYoid unne(·essary repetition the Court's 
attention is called to the following cited cases which 
~upport the fort•going statement of the law. 
8teinkc t. Sztuuka, et al. (1936) 364 Ill. 3-14, 4 N.E. 2d 
ii~: Mou,·er c. Jlou:er, (l\f2-1) 64 Utah 260, 228 P. 911; 
Clwm/Jcrlain c. Larsen, (193-L 83 Utah 420, 29 P. 2d 355; 
Stanley 1. Stanley, (1939) 97 Utah 520, 94 P. 2d 265; 
and First oecurity Ba11k r. Burgi, (1952) 122 Utah 445, 
l;)l P. 2d 291 rtah cases. 
Counter t:. Cuunter, 232 P. 2d 551 (Calif.) quoting 
11 ith apprnrnl from Azecedo r. Azevedo, l Cal. App. 2d 
.iu,t, ;iw;, :lG P.2d 1078, 1079, that manual tradition is not 
Pnough hut must lw with intent of presently passing title . 
.1Iadrnw1w et al. cs. Se.nrner et al., 256 P.2d 34 (Calif); 
Solo111u11 c. TValtu11, :2-±1 P. 2d 49 (Calif.) 
C. PLAI~TIFFS SHOULD HA VE BEEN PER-
:\IITTED TO HA VE A TRIAL ON THE ISSUES 
A'.\'D PRODUCE EVIDENCE TO PROVE THEIR 
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CONTENTIONS THAT THE DEEDS I~ Qt:ES-
TION WERE VOID BY REASON OF THE FACT 
THAT THEY WERE AN INVALID A TTE:IIPT 
TO l\IAKE A TEST Al\IENT ARY DISPOSITIO~. 
Plaintiffs lu.l\'l' tcintrndl'd i11 tlH·ir (·01nplaillt <lll'; 
plaintiff Claude D. Hannan has tPstit'it'cl in Iii." dPpo,iti11n 
that the soll' rea:->on and Jllll']JOSP for tlH· i1rr·parntun 111 
the dl't>d:,; under whieh ddendanb dairn an intl'Mt i1, 
the property wa::; to avoid the ex1wnsv of prribatl', anu 
it wa:,; the dt>elared intent that no tit!<' slwulcl pa" t11 
defendant:,; and other ehildn·n of plaintiff Claud(' ii. 
Harman until after hi:,; dPath. Thl· hm in this .1uri~dir­
tion, a:,; \\·ell a:--; in most jurnidiction, appear:-\ to bl· 1n·ll 
_ :,;dtled that the intent of tlH' grant or is tlH· ddt>nuinin.~ 
factor 'du'never the <1ue:,;tion is rni:wd a;-, to 1d1dlwr H 
present interest pas:,;ed or the atte111ptPd c·o1n-1·1-all1· 1~ 1«1 
invalid by reason of the fact that it "as an atM1q11r 11 
testamentary disposition. The la\\' in man.'· jnrsiclictiu1:' 
is smmuarized in 31 ALR (~cl) 3--L'., as fC1ll(I\\":): 
"The follo\\'ing cases <•xpressl; n·affirw t/J1' 
rule laid down in tlw original annotation that 1:1 
con:,;truin<r an instnuuent in the fon11 of a dctir. 
. , b . . · ]" "( n• tJI" 
eontammg provis10rn; iwstpomng or nm m,., 
grantee's rights untµ the grantor's death, t! 11• 
intent of the grant~ as to tlw interc>tit ,r]mh iit 
· 1 1 t -rrero~a!Jk mtend1i to pa1->::; - w iet H:'l' a preti<'ll 1 . 
one or an ambulatory om~ to take effrct after 111 ' 
death - is controlling." 
. l 1 1- • not con-
11 erd~- lwtaU1'<' a d<'('cl 1:--; prqiarec, rn(' i " . 
. , . _ - l· . ii"l!l~adwJJ, trnllmg. 'Jl1(' real natnn' of a partwn ,i1 ' 
- . . . . . ·t •1)\\'U\' \i1' 
rat!H'l' than tlH~ forrn 111 \\'l11el1 1t '" ea:ot, rnu:-; ' · 
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thf' decisiw fador in eases of this kind. 
In the B1trfti eaS(', supra, the Ptah Supreme Court 
uphdd tlw Distrid Court's finding from the evidence 
that a purported dePd was an attempted testamentary 
ili~position and void. 
ln the eas(' of First Security Bank of Ctah v. Burgi, 
l~l P. :2d :297, thl' Court at page :299 said in part: 
''. .. ThP testimony reveals that the deceased 
dearly intPnckd that tlw clet>d and bill of sale pass 
the property to the defendant. The facts and cir-
eumstances, however, support the trial court's 
finding that the decesaed had no intention to pass 
title immediately, but that such deed and bill of 
sale were to become operative upon the death of 
the deeedent. Fnder such circumstances the deed 
and bill of sale were clearly testamentary in char-
ader and intent and were inoperative, since they 
did not conform to statutory requirements for 
testamentary disposition. In Re Alexander's Es-
tatf', 10-l etah :286, 139 P. (2d) 432." 
The District Court's summary judgment in the in-
stant case erroneously and unlawfully precluded the 
plaintiff~ from showing the same thing as was shown 
Ill the Burgi ease and which was upheld by the Supreme 
Court and mmlted in the final dl'termination of the case. 
The following citations an• in accordance with the 
law as stated above: 
iii 11' Ale.1a11de1 's /;'state, 10-t lTtah :288, 1:39 P. 2d 
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-!32; Cowder c Counter, 232 P. 2d ;)31 (Calif.): Jlr:i: 
11w1111 c. Sexauer, 25G P. 2d 3-! (Calif.). 
The District Court obviously enl'd in grantinl' "li.: 
mary judgment dismissing plaintiffs' complaint. 1'1,. 
law in this jurisdiction, and gem•rally throughout t11e 
United States, n_'(1uires that the Court should han· cui1 
sidered the case most favorable to the plaintiff~ 111 rnak-
ing a determination on a motion for smnmary judgl!leut. 
The Court not only failed to consider the case nMt 
favorable to plaintiffs, but arbitrarily and without am 
justification in law or equity erroneously pn·duckd tlh' 
plaintiffs from producing evidence at a trial in regaru 
to their contention that there was no dl'lin·r:· of the 
deeds under which the defendants elaim an inte1wt in 
subject property, and that the true d1aradPr of tl11 
deeds was an attempted testamentary dispos1tiu11 11bicll ' 
did not conform to the statutory requin·rnenb of 1 1 ·~ 1 ~­
mentary disposition and therefon•, void. The defendant' 
by their motion for summary judgme11t admitted that 
there was no dispute as to fact. Thpn•fon•, the plaintiff, 
statement of the facts must stand as true, and based 
1 · · f'f ' f' f' 1 · t · f"f" ' are l'ntitled upon p amti s statement o acts, p am i :; -
t . d .cl. l cl cl . ,tion with a o a JU grnent vm mg t ie ee s m c1ue::; ' 
resultin"' declaration that the defrn<lants had no interr'
1 
b Jd 
· l l · f' ·1· tl Court shou m t ie su JJ<~ct property. That a1 mg, 1e 
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rewrS(' tlw Di;-;trid Court':-: :-:u111rnar~· judgment and re-
mand tht· ca~c for trial. 
He~pedfully rnbmitted, 
4~A Y _.\X~l'RTOX, /~,~/ %/~~jl-~~4; 
j'.J{e,rc.tzLf /J /J!~J 
Reed H. Richards and 7-
Barrie U. ~frKay 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellants 
7:20 X ewhouse Building 
:::ialt Lake City, utah 
